Small Pool of Rich Donors Dominates Election Giving NYT. “Giving.”
Not the retiring type: meet the people still working in their 70s, 80s and 90s Guardian
Today’s thinkers lack glamour, malice, looks, and a penchant for mandarin invective. Will intellectual combat ever regain the entertainment value of the mandarin to orange : spade to shovel »?
New York Times editorial, The I.R.S. Gives Up on ‘Dark Money’:
Wall Street Journal, UBS Deal Shows Clinton’s Complicated Ties; Donations to Family Foundation Increased After Secretary of State’s Involvement in Tax Case:
Cara Griffith, A Look at Information Sharing Agreements Between the IRS and States (Tax Analysts Blog)
How are optimal taxes affected by the presence of superstar phenomena at the top of the earnings distribution? To answer this question, we extend the Mirrlees model to incorporate an assignment problem in the labor market that generates superstar effects. Perhaps surprisingly, rather than providing a rationale for higher taxes, we show that superstar effects provides a force for lower marginal taxes, conditional on the observed distribution of earnings. Superstar effects make the earnings schedule convex, which increases the responsiveness of individual earnings to tax changes. We show that various common elasticity measures are not sufficient statistics and must be adjusted upwards in optimal tax formulas. Finally, we study a comparative static that does not keep the observed earnings distribution fixed: when superstar technologies are introduced, inequality increases but we obtain a neutrality result, finding tax rates at the top unaltered.