Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Deutsche Bank protected Trump from scrutiny, leak shows

Deutsche Bank protected Trump from scrutiny, leak shows


The German multinational assured US authorities that Donald Trump had “no bank-related connections” to Russia after its client won the presidency in 2016. A trove of leaked documents, which shine a light on other controversies at Deutsche Bank stretching back nearly two decades, suggests otherwise.

COLLECTION: THE RUSSIA FILES
AUTHOR: LUKAS KOTKAMP


After Donald Trump’s shock presidential win in 2016 amid allegations of Kremlin interference, US officials sought to establish whether Russian money had played a role in his campaign.

As part of the probe, the US Congress turned to Deutsche Bank, where the businessman-turned-president was a client. 

A subpoena compelled the German multinational to report whether accounts associated with Trump had raised money-laundering concerns.

Deutsche conducted an internal review but found “no bank-related connections between President Trump and Russia”.

But a massive leak of documents from the bank – which shine a light not just on its handling of Trump but other high-profile clients and controversies over three decades – now complicates that conclusion.

The files show that in 2014, Deutsche reported a suspicious transaction involving DT Marks Baku LLC, a Trump company in Azerbaijan. 

The company had received funds from a customer of Danske Bank in Estonia. Despite investigating, the bank could not establish the purpose of the payment or the relationship between the sender and recipient. This transaction was not reported to the US Congress. 

Then, in 2017 and 2019, the bank identified further suspicious payments involving Trump’s companies. Its own analysis linked the money to the Azerbaijani Laundromat, an international money-funnelling scheme, and to a Russian money-laundering network connected to several Kremlin-loyal oligarchs. 

Deutsche Bank reported those transactions to US authorities, as is required by law. Yet one significant detail was missing from those reports: the fact that the companies receiving the questionable funds belonged to the president. 

When Trump was elected president, Deutsche Bank created a special project for handling him as a client. Its codename was “Novus Ordo”, or “New Order”. Documents were secured, access was restricted and communications encrypted, even for some members of senior staff.

The leaked documents do not, by themselves, establish that Trump participated in money laundering or that Russian interests guaranteed his loans. 

They do, however, raise questions about the completeness of the bank’s reporting and the way it handled suspicious transactions involving a politically powerful client.

And Trump’s case is just one of many that surfaced during a year-long investigation by more than 200 journalists from 56 media outlets, dubbed Inside Deutsche Bank.

Billions in fines

The investigation is based on a leak of more than 15 million confidential files from the bank, which includes emails, client information, risk assessments, and records of financial-crime investigations. 

Two whistleblowers, whose identities are being protected, provided material to Indian journalist Josy Joseph and South African investigative journalist Khadija Sharife, who then shared the documents with a broader consortium.

They also supplied the documents to the US Department of Justice, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the United Kingdom treasury, according to the whistleblowers’ lawyer. 

Outside of law and order...a shambles

Their stated motivation was to expose alleged criminal misconduct in Deutsche Bank’s business relationships with corrupt regimes, particularly its dealings with Russian oligarchs, and to highlight the bank’s repeated legal violations, management failures and ethical shortcomings amid the war in Ukraine.

The documents reveal a broad pattern of misconduct. They describe warnings about suspicious money flows, weak monitoring systems and cases in which commercial considerations appeared to outweigh concerns raised by internal watchdogs. 

Since 2000, authorities have raided Deutsche Bank’s offices on at least 43 occasions. Over approximately 25 years, the bank paid €18 billion in fines for misconduct including market manipulation, fraud, and failures to prevent money laundering. 

When the bank’s current CEO Christian Sewing took the helm in 2018, he promised to turn around an institution whose troubled reputation stretched back to its role in financing key elements of the Nazi Reich. 

Publicly, he spoke of reviving a culture in which Deutsche Bank would stop being on the defensive about its chequered past and start winning profitable business back from rivals, while becoming considerably more selective about the clients it took on.

Financial results improved, lending credibility to Sewing’s turnaround strategy. But behind the improving figures, the bank was struggling to put his vision into practice. 

During the first years of Sewing’s tenure, the bank remained in dire straits, internal correspondence between senior management reveals. 

In 2019, its chief operating officer described its operations as “an absolute cluster fuck”, effectively operating “outside of law and order”. Later that year, the new head of anti-financial crime reportedly characterised internal controls as “a shambles”.

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The warnings went beyond poor processes. Some suggested Deutsche was on the brink of closure. One senior employee warned that German authorities could issue a cease-and-desist order against the entire Corporate Investment division because of wide-ranging issues. 

Despite its extensive compliance infrastructure, Deutsche Bank repeatedly failed to identify and act on serious financial crime risks, the leaked documents showed. 

It failed to report millions of transactions linked to potential human trafficking and drug smuggling in Colombia, provided vast loans to a Russian oil company without knowing its ownership, and overlooked a multi-billion-euro money-laundering network, according to an internal report. 

Know your customer

Deutsche’s difficulties often stemmed from a tension between commercial imperatives and ethical obligations. This conflict was evident in discussions of know-your-customer (KYC) requirements, which oblige banks to verify their clients’ identities and establish the origins of their money.

In one email, Sewing complained that regulations were crippling revenues. Elsewhere, he cautioned against “overinterpreting” stricter standards, warning that it risked driving away clients.

One case involved Timur Kulibayev, a Kazakh billionaire whose business interests span commodities, real estate, and banking.

Kulibayev, who became a Deutsche Bank client through his companies in 2006, is the son-in-law of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s longtime president until 2019. 

A 2010 US diplomatic cable described his alleged “avarice for large bribes”, and in 2013 Deutsche Bank’s own internal reporting warned that a change in Kazakhstan’s political leadership could expose him to criminal investigations concerning deals from the Nazarbayev era, potentially drawing in the bank and its compliance processes. 

Those concerns never fully went away and in late 2018 they resurfaced with a vengeance. 

That year, the Swiss NGO Public Eye alleged Kulibayev helped one of the world’s biggest oil companies – Vitol – obtain a quasi-monopoly in his home country. Deutsche Bank compliance staff then revisited “historical” concerns and thought Kulibayev warranted fresh scrutiny.

In 2019, Deutsche Bank executives considered helping Halyk Bank, Kazakhstan’s largest lender, which was owned by Kulibayev and his wife, obtain a secondary listing on the London Stock Exchange. Some employees objected, pointing out that Deutsche had previously dropped the bank itself as a direct client over money-laundering concerns.

A planned committee meeting intended to examine Kulibayev’s integrity was suddenly cancelled by senior staff. At that point, Kulibayev and his companies were bringing in an annual €6 million in fees alone, equal to the fees paid by Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom, which was also a client of the bank. 

The London listing was forced through, but compliance staff moved to impose safeguards, requiring the proceeds from the listing to be transferred directly into designated accounts in Switzerland and Luxembourg. 

In a move intended to mitigate financial crime risks, funds from other sources were not permitted.

Within a month, those safeguards were tested.

In January 2020, employees flagged an unexpected $15-million transfer from an account in the United Arab Emirates. When pressed by the bank, Kulibayev’s representatives claimed the money represented dividends from previous years, but compliance staff remained unconvinced. 

Internal emails mention “confusing information” coming from the oligarch’s team. 

The bank blocked incoming funds and escalated the matter to the highest level of its anti-money-laundering team. Investigators then widened their review to include Kulibayev’s holding companies which were Deutsche Bank clients.

From then on, Deutsche investigators seemingly questioned everything, from unexplained transactions to inexplicable dividend payments between Kulibayev’s companies, one described as dormant and without assets. Internal correspondence raised the possibility that some companies were being used simply “to pass through money”. Several transactions, investigators warned, “make no sense”.

In May 2020, Deutsche Bank acted on a recommendation from its anti-financial-crime forum, which said it should end the relationship as the bank could not understand Kulibayev’s finances. 

This was the first “cross divisional / holistic review” in nearly 14 years of him being a client. 

Kulibayev’s lawyers told Follow the Moneythat the billionaire had never concealed his source of wealth from Deutsche Bank and that neither he nor his representatives had knowingly provided false or misleading information. They added that Mr Kulibayev could not be expected to explain Deutsche Bank employees’ internal views or motivations, or be held responsible for the bank’s decisions.

Oligarch review packs

In Russia, meanwhile, the bank sought to recruit the offspring of Kremlin-linked politicians in pursuit of local opportunities. 

Among its hires was the son of Russia’s deputy finance minister, who later passed information from his father’s ministry to colleagues, information the bank itself concluded it should not have access to.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission investigated Deutsche Bank’s politically connected Russian hiring programme. In 2019, the bank agreed to pay $16.1 million to settle the case. An internal calculation included in the leaked material suggested that such hires had helped generate more than $190 million in business.

Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western sanctions forced banks to reassess their Russian ties. Ulrich Göres, Deutsche Bank’s former global anti-money-laundering chief, recalled drawing up lists of “good and bad oligarchs” of Russian, Uzbek and Kazakh descent (including Kulibayev).

Known as “oligarch review packs”, the reports ran to hundreds of pages, compiling allegations against clients whom the bank considered reputational risks. The allegations ranged from corruption to links to organised crime and, in some cases, murder.

Yet identifying the risks did not necessarily mean acting on them. Deutsche retained a significant portion of the clients named in the reports, the vast majority of whom were later sanctioned over the war in Ukraine.

The distinction between good and bad oligarchs, in other words, did not prevent risky business from continuing.

Leaked files show that Deutsche Bank worked to help Russian oligarch Andrey Melnichenko, even after he was placed under European Union sanctions. 

Melnichenko is one of Russia’s richest men and his “prosperity is closely linked to Putin’s continued success”, according to internal bank documents seen by Follow the Money. 

One day before he was targeted by EU sanctions, parts of his billion-dollar coal empire were transferred to his wife. Shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, investigators with the Dutch fiscal intelligence agency FIOD opened a probe into Deutsche Bank. 

Investigators suspected that because Melnichenko’s wife wasn’t sanctioned, Deutsche Bank readily continued its relationship with the firm.

One staffer warned that the oligarch’s decision to transfer his business to his wife “could be considered sanctions evasion”. Yet an attempt was later made to help him withdraw cash through a Deutsche branch in Singapore.

The bank also refrained from freezing his European accounts, despite EU sanctions explicitly naming him. Citing “legal uncertainties”, it decided not to freeze the accounts of the legal entities involved, but to “technically block them” instead. This distinction mattered: Melnichenko could still deposit his millions safely at the bank. 

A spokesperson for the oligarch told reporters that he technically did not transfer his companies to his wife. “He resigned as beneficiary of the discretionary trust holding shares in both companies, with his wife automatically succeeding him under the terms of a trust deed,” the spokesperson said. 

The case illustrates a recurring problem in Deutsche Bank’s handling of sanctioned clients and politically exposed persons: the difference between formally complying with restrictions and ensuring that the underlying financial relationships no longer posed a risk.

Money Laundering Hub

The suspicious money connected to Trump did not originate in Deutsche Bank accounts. 

It passed through the bank’s systems because Deutsche acted as a correspondent for Danske Bank. Correspondent banking allows financial institutions to process payments on behalf of one another, giving smaller banks access to international markets and currencies. It is also a business that can leave major banks processing transactions for customers they know very little about.

The risks were already clear from the Danske Bank scandal. In that scandal, Deutsche was a major correspondent for Danske’s Estonian branch, which hosted the Russian and Azeri money-laundering schemes from which Trump’s firm received money. 

Approximately €200 billion in largely illicit money flowed through the branch between 2007 and 2015, much of it originating in Russia. German authorities fined Deutsche just €13.5 million for its role in the affair – a sum senior executives considered negligible compared with the fees the business generated, according to leaked documents.

The same structural risks appear in Deutsche’s handling of a network it found just years later. 

Between 2017 and 2020, more than €1.7 billion passed through Deutsche’s systems via a network of shell companies. Inside Deutsche was able to link the network to Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska, a close Kremlin associate who was sanctioned by the US in 2018. Although his name did not appear in the companies’ official records, reporters traced transactions to his wife, business associates and proxies.

The scale of what followed was substantial. Deutsche identified nearly a dozen potential sanctions-evasion cases connected to the network, which it reported to the US authorities under its obligations arising from agreements with the US Department of Justice. Yet not one of Deutsche’s suspicious activity reports named Deripaska. (Follow the Money will publish a more thorough report into the network on November 18.)

Frankfurt Raid

The questions surrounding Deutsche’s compliance controls have not gone away. In early 2026, German investigators searched the bank’s Frankfurt headquarters in an investigation involving transactions associated with Roman Abramovich, the Russian billionaire and former Chelsea football club owner who is under EU sanctions.

Investigators are examining whether suspicious activity was reported promptly.

In the United States, meanwhile, Deutsche has entered into multiple deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) with the Department of Justice. In 2015, it reached an agreement over the manipulation of benchmark interest rates. In 2021, it entered into another DPA, agreeing to pay more than $130 million to resolve investigations into improper payments to third-party intermediaries and a commodities fraud scheme.

A DPA allows prosecutors to defer criminal proceedings against a company, usually in return for cooperation and commitments to improve its compliance systems. If the company fulfils the agreement, prosecution can be avoided. 

But Deutsche’s record shows that these agreements do not guarantee lasting change: in 2022, the DOJ found that the bank had breached the terms of its 2021 agreement and extended its monitoring of the institution.

Statement from Deutsche Bank

The following general statement was provided to the consortium. Additionally, the bank answered some 300 questions on a variety of topics. 

“The matters mentioned in your inquiry date back many years and in some cases as much as two decades. Where relevant, these matters were reviewed at the time and were discussed with regulators. 

We are a different bank today. Under Christian Sewing’s leadership, Deutsche Bank has gone through a fundamental transformation. We made substantial investments in our control environment while restoring sustainable profitability, as evidenced by record profits in recent quarters. This involved €7 billion of direct investments in our control environment between 2019-2025, supported by significant technology investments. 

These investments have been accompanied by a reinforced approach to identify and manage risks and a fundamental shift in culture. This work has supported the remediation of legacy issues and the completion of significant regulatory milestones. 

Our progress has been recognized by the market, key regulators and supervisory authorities, as well as clients and other stakeholders. 

We remain committed to ensuring continuous enhancements of our control environment and a culture of integrity.”

The White House and Oleg Deripaska failed to respond to repeated requests to comment on the claims made in this article.

Additional reporting provided by Khadija Sharife, Josy Joseph, Frederik Obermaier, Bastian Obermayer, Brian Fitzpatrick, Sophia Baumann (PTM), Maria Christoph (PTM), Eva Jung (Berlingske), Michael Lund (Berlingske), Maria Fernanda Cruz (Barracuda Media), Aidila Razak (Barracuda Media), Nikita Saxena, Craig Bentley-McKune (Financial Mail), Vernon Wessels (Financial Mail), iStories, Hakan Tanriverdi (PTM), Naish Gawen (Data Desk), Maria Teresa Ronderos (CLIP), Francisca Skoknic (CLIP), Karina Shedrofsky (DARC), Vivian Yap (Malaysiakini), Nigel Aw (Malaysiakini), Aung Naing (Myanmar Now), Amy Doffegnies (Myanmar Now,) Hala Nasreddine (DARAJ), Roman Katin (iStories), Irina Dolinina (iStories), Jeremie Baruch (Le Monde), Karina Shedrofsky (Barracuda).

The Inside Deutsche Bank investigation was coordinated by Barracuda Media in South Africa, with technical support from the Data and Research Center(DARC) in Germany.