Sunday, July 05, 2026

What J. D. Vance Once Knew

What J. D. Vance Once Knew 

Ten years ago, the vice president wrote that one day, voters would realize the truth about Donald Trump. That day has now arrived. 
By Peter Wehner

 en years ago today, in the middle of the presidential campaign, an essay in The Atlantic set out to explain the appeal of Donald Trump. Its author traced that appeal to the social decline and cultural trauma he had known firsthand, in an impoverished childhood.

The author, J. D. Vance, had only days earlier published Hillbilly Elegy, which went on to sell roughly 3 million copies and made him, almost overnight, the country’s designated interpreter of working-class grievances. And he was quite good at it.

In the July 4, 2016, essay, Vance described the places from which the pain came—factories that downsized or ceased to exist, along with the jobs they had provided; the aesthetic decline in once beautiful and vibrant towns; families that were shattering or never forming in the first place; and anger and frustration with a government that had broken the trust with the people it was meant to serve. “During this election season,” Vance wrote, “it appears that many Americans have reached for a new pain reliever.” His name was Donald Trump.

In the midst of a social crisis, Vance observed, Trump offered “an easy escape from the pain. To every complex problem, he promises a simple solution.” But, he argued, such promises were a cheap high. “He never offers details for how these plans will work, because he can’t. Trump’s promises are the needle in America’s collective vein.”

“Trump is cultural heroin,” Vance wrote. “He makes some feel better for a bit. But he cannot fix what ails them, and one day they’ll realize it.”

“One day” is today.

The trump presidency, while still quite dangerous, is also collapsing, cracking under the weight of its own choices. The main driver is the economy, which he sold as his strong point. We’re seeing tariff-driven price increases, gas prices that spiked from less than $3 to more than $4 a gallon during a 100-day war against Iran that America lost, wages failing to keep pace with the cost of living, and inflation ticking back up. Manufacturing jobs, which Trump promised to bring roaring back, are still being lost. Health care has gotten much more expensive on his watch, and millions have lost coverage.

At the top of the nation’s health agencies sits Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who in a single year moved to cut the list of recommended childhood vaccines nearly in half, fired the government’s vaccine advisers and replaced them with skeptics, and presided over the worst measles outbreak in 30 years. The National Institutes of Health, the crown jewel of American biomedical science, has seen billions in research cut, clinical trials canceled, and labs closed, resulting in a “brain drain” that rival nations are racing to exploit. And the dismantling of USAID, along with the gutting of PEPFAR—the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the bipartisan AIDS-relief program credited with saving more than 25 million lives—has, by credible estimates, already cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, most of them children, with projections of as many as 14 million more by 2030 if the cuts hold.

Americans are deeply divided and intensely polarized, with pessimism at or near a multidecade high. Faith in nearly every major institution—government, the press, universities, religious leaders—sits at or near the bottom of the modern record.

It’s no surprise, then, that Trump’s approval rating is anemic. (In one recent poll, it’s down to 30 percent.) His remaining support is soft, while the unhappiness with him is intense. Republican members of Congress are beginning to break with him. His MAGA base is fracturing. Former stalwart supporters, such as Tucker Carlson, are openly mocking the president. (“Shut up, bitch! I don’t take you seriously,” Carlson said 10 days ago.) Trump looks weak and lost, a husk of a man still performing the same routine to a crowd that is drifting toward the exits. The country is finally waking to the comedown Vance predicted.

This is the context in which Americans are celebrating the nation’s 250th birthday. It’s not simply that things are going badly; it’s that their view of the United States is darkening. Pride in being an American has hit a new low. Nearly 80 percent of Americans believethe Founders would be disappointed with how the country has turned out.

Some of that sentiment reflects the fact that the president and those around him subvert the rule of law, decency, and democratic restraints. Many Americans believe the country is, in its current incarnation, betraying its ideals. They feel at odds with the nation they love.

And this is true as well: Among more and more Americans there is a sickening recognition of what the United States, during the Trump era, has become. They see it as a pitiable farce, a verdict that is hard to dispute when a nation has twice elected a carnival barker as its leader. For a historically proud people, that is an indignity and a humiliation. We are in the bread-and-circuses phase of the American story, the point at which a great republic, having lost its sense of purpose, makes do with spectacle.

Which brings me back to J. D. Vance. Ten summers ago he understood, better than most, the threat Trump posed to America. Vance, who described himself as a “Never Trump guy,” thought Trump was an “idiot.” He admitted to a friend at the time that he goes “back and forth between thinking Trump is a cynical asshole like Nixon who wouldn’t be that bad (and might even prove useful) or that he’s America’s Hitler.” But then ambition made its offer, and Vance, who had seen the danger so clearly, discovered he could see his way around it. The first stop was the Senate; the next was the vice presidency.

Along the way, the Vance of Hillbilly Elegy—a teller of hard truths, a morally serious person committed to honesty even when it cost him, beholden to no one—became a cynic, a partner in a cruel enterprise, a peddler of lies he is surely clever enough to recognize as such, a man whose only fixed commitment is to his own rise to power.

In his memoir, Vance wrote, “Nothing compares to the fear that you’re becoming the monster in your closet.” It’s a poignant line, referring to a man raised amid the addiction and volatility he feared he might inherit. The monster Vance feared was a private one; the monster he became is a public one. His legacy turns out to be a much more destructive than the one he was afraid of inheriting.

america will outlast trump and vance; the issue is whether they will be seen as a parenthesis the country closes or the opening of a different, dark chapter.

Abraham Lincoln, in his 1838 address to the Young Men’s Lyceum on the subject of the perpetuation of our political institutions, warned, “As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.” What Lincoln meant is that the threat America faced was not external conquest; it was internal decay. If destruction is to be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher.

Lincoln was responding to a wave of mob violence in the 1830s, including lynchings such as the murder of the abolitionist newspaper editor Elijah Lovejoy. The “props” that once supported a “political edifice of liberty and equal rights” were “decayed, and crumbled away.” Out of such decay might rise a demagogue, a future tyrant, feeding on what the Lincoln scholar Diana Schaub called “politically degenerative passions.”

The remedy, according to Lincoln, was a “political religion” based on reverence for the law and fidelity to America’s constitutional process. Lincoln was in turn relying on the wisdom of George Washington, and particularly Washington’s farewell address. America’s two greatest presidents shared an intense conviction: that a republic depends on some measure of virtue in its citizens and some measure of integrity in its leaders. Without them, the temple of liberty will fall.


The past decade in America has been a lost decade. Far too many Americans have cheered on the men tearing at the temple. But Americans can now see, later than they should have, the cost of the damage. It is within our power to make it whole. What remains is to find the will. There is a name for those who do: renewers of ruined cities, repairers of the breach, restorers of streets in which to dwell.

THE INCREDIBLE FREEDOM OF NOT TRYING TO LOOK GOOD

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A new book explores the benefits of accepting ugliness instead of trying to change it.

No one explicitly told me that long hair was beautiful, but even as a child, I knew it was. My Barbies had it. Disney princesses had it. The American Girl dolls I coveted had it. So I had it too, even though it was a literal pain. “One must suffer to be beautiful,” my dad would quip when I yelped and jerked away from my mother pulling a comb through my always-tangled hair. Cutting it short would have been more practical. But I wanted to be beautiful—of course I did.

Humans learn early what is attractive, and some people spend their life trying to achieve that standard. They watch as, in pursuit of a strong jawline and social-media fame, one young man repeatedly taps his face with a hammer, or as an already thin celebrity goes on a crash diet in order to fit into a famous dead woman’s dress for a few minutes. Americans pay for makeup and hair removal, blowouts and manicures, personal trainers and facials, botulinum toxins injected into muscles and synthetic hyaluronic acid to plump lips—collectively spending hundreds of billions of dollars a year to achieve the look they want, or at least the look they think they should have.

This isn’t driven just by vanity: According to research, aesthetically pleasing people are generally more economically successful, and appearance-based discrimination incurs measurable economic costs. Beauty is historically tangled up with notions of morality, cleanliness, and fitness to lead. Being beautiful opens doors socially, too; a person’s actual qualities and abilities may be bolstered by what psychologists call an “attractiveness halo” effect, and such treatment can lead to beautiful people having a more optimistic outlook on life.

Good looks and their benefits are widely known and openly discussed, but there’s far less talk about the experience of not being attractive. In 2022, the philosopher Thomas J. Spiegel wrote about the uncomfortable reality that discrimination based on looks is a kind of injustice, one with both psychological and material consequences. The writer Stephanie Fairyington has been thinking about Spiegel’s work, and the concept of attractiveness, for a long time. What, and who, is it all supposed to be for, anyway? What is it meant to achieve?

Good looks and their benefits are widely known and openly discussed, but there’s far less talk about the experience of not being attractive. In 2022, the philosopher Thomas J. Spiegel wrote about the uncomfortable reality that discrimination based on looks is a kind of injustice, one with both psychological and material consequences. The writer Stephanie Fairyington has been thinking about Spiegel’s work, and the concept of attractiveness, for a long time. What, and who, is it all supposed to be for, anyway? What is it meant to achieve?

In her new book, Ugly: A Letter to My Daughter, Fairyington investigates why physical beauty—as defined by subjective standards that have shifted over time and still vary widely among cultures and generations—is so highly valued. And she begins it by admitting that she is ugly. Not “in a way that would elicit mouth-gaping stares,” she clarifies; she’s just “bland, offensively so, like a person who’s given up or doesn’t try.” But even hinting at this fact without self-deprecation upsets people around her, especially women, who “can’t let a thought like that hang in the air.” Accepting and naming ugliness is sacrilegious, “very nearly the worst thought to think of oneself,” she writes. Not everyone can be conventionally beautiful, of course, but these reactions imply that the real sin is to leave one’s looks alone rather than taking advantage of all of the available interventions—all of the ways a person can fix themselves.

What is a self-proclaimed ugly woman to do? And, more urgent, how is Fairyington to raise her traditionally good-looking tween daughter in a world that will teach her to value, nurture, and improve those looks at the cost of pursuing other desires? Ugly, which is addressed to an older, future version of her child, is dedicated to trying to answer that question. The book is both a philosophical text and a mother’s lament as she tries to imagine a new world in which physical beauty is no longer something worth focusing on.

Fairyington is not naive enough to think we can simply ignore looks. Human beings are social creatures, and so of course we understand ourselves in relation to others. It makes sense that among a group of friends, say, we might recognize who is shorter and who is taller, who is thinner and who is fatter, just as we would acknowledge that some of us enjoy opera while others prefer video games. The trouble, she points out, is that most people don’t perceive these facts to be just interesting variations; instead, they’re evaluative, tied to dichotomies such as good or bad, hot or not. She’s also not saying that we should be challenging beauty norms only by brazenly celebrating what is considered ugly as beautiful. She does explore that resistance through figures such as the English musician Poly Styrene and the drag queen Fauxnique, and she acknowledges the creative, playful, powerful effects of emphasizing features that we’re taught to downplay. But embracing a spectacle of ugliness can be just as labor intensive as chasing unattainable ideals of beauty—and can affirm what is considered attractive.


The author vividly remembers what it was like to care about her looks as a tomboyish kid who never lived up to the standards other people had for her, which felt especially painful because of how beautiful her mother was. When Fairyington was 10, an adult contemptuously asked, “That’sChrysí’s daughter?” Fairyington hopes to spare her child from going through the same thing. Hopes is the key word: Ugly is an aspirational book, an attempt to explore how else we might live inside our body and with one another. It represents a parent’s attempt to remake society into a welcoming place for her child—or, failing that, to make her child into the kind of person who can see past society’s most damaging messages. This tension—between working toward a better world and arming her child against the one we have—leads to some of the book’s most interesting and difficult moments.

When their daughter wants to include her love of shopping in a bio set to appear under a poem she wrote, Fairyington and her wife initially discourage it, dismissing shopping as a vapid pursuit. When the author learns that her wife and a family friend are planning trips to take her child to the nail salon, she disapproves: “Why are we encouraging her self-objectification so early?” she asks, to which the friend responds, “You don’t hate women, do you, Steph?”

It’s a joke, but one with bite. Fairyington is belittling the leisure activities of a significant part of the female population, and that attitude doesn’t exist in a vacuum—woman-coded cultural touchstones such as Taylor Swiftromance novels, and reality TV are often viewed as somewhat silly, whereas typically masculine entertainment, such as sports and historical war dramas, is more often treated with gravity. Yet Fairyington doesn’t wish to categorically denigrate the feminine; she grew up admiring subversive feminist subcultures such as the Riot Grrrl punk movement, and she wishes only that her daughter would consider other models of girlhood. Fairyington feels constrained by a culture in which women are constantly pushed to “morph our bodies and faces” to remain desirable (which, she notes, mostly means desirable to men). In her view, nail polish, makeup, and personal grooming are all part of this ongoing racket.

I don’t disagree with her claim at its core. Still, I do think that, as the online adage goes, people are allowed to enjoy things. What makes us feel good isn’t always good for us. Untangling why we like what we like is a lifelong project. And at the same time that Fairyington criticizes her kid’s interests, she also admits her own hypocrisy: She takes pride in how legible her daughter’s beauty is to others. “When I walk down the street with you,” she writes, “and see admiring smiles, like the flashes on paparazzi cameras, flickering at you with reflexive approval, I think, I may be a failed woman, but just look at my beautiful—and exceedingly normal—daughter.”

Even though being typically feminine comes with obvious rewards, Fairyington recognizes that her child isn’t—consciously, at least—trying to appeal to anyone but herself. She happens to like wearing nail polish. She likes a lot of things: admiring the outrageous outfits donned by drag queens in Provincetown, going to her parkour class, attempting witchcraft rituals under the light of a full moon, boys. She, like any other kid, is both similar to and different from her mothers, and Fairyington knows that her interests and personality will continue to change. All Fairyington can do now is provide alternatives.

Between her more analytical and philosophical passages, Fairyington transcribes mundane conversations with her child. In one scene, her daughter banishes a carefully planned outfit to her Halloween-costume bin after a classmate makes fun of it, and Fairyington can only watch sadly as someone else’s opinion influences her kid’s preferences. In other scenes, Fairyington tries to have her daughter think about things in new ways: She asks her what she likes about what her body can do, as opposed to what it looks like, and her daughter responds that she loves that her body can swim, make bracelets, dance, sing, climb trees, and play video games.

Ugly ends with an unlikely turn toward wonder and awe—feelings that can, according to researchers, help quiet the self-criticism and displeasure that seeps into our lives amid constant reminders of what we need to do to fix ourselves. It’s a good place to end the book, an invitation to her child—and to readers—to see our own smallness and find comfort, rather than despair, in the insignificance of many of our worries.

But I can’t help returning repeatedly to Fairyington’s assessment of her face early in the book. Giving up, or not trying, feels to me like a powerful kind of transgression. Beauty and wellness companies make billions off our attempts to control our appearance—but simply accepting what we look like circumvents the entire preoccupation. Some of us will always be naturally prettier, and some uglier; there’s never been a level playing field. But how much space might be freed up for other endeavors if those of us who find the whole thing exhausting just … took our attention elsewhere?

I found out in a small way a few years ago, when I stopped shaving my legs and underarms. At first, yes, it was partially a middle finger to what was expected of me. It didn’t solve my insecurities; I still felt self-conscious and on display, like the ugliest person in any room. Then I realized I’d pretty much always felt that way, regardless of the effort I put in. Once I stopped—except, in rare situations, to please myself or survive in work settings—I was free of the constant sense of having failed. Ironically, moving to Los Angeles, where professionally pretty people abound, liberated me further; there’s no way I can measure up here. Instead of trying to, I appreciate the beauty around me—L.A.’s golden light, the hills and mountains and ocean, the mysterious and hilarious vanity plates—and spend my time on other things, such as reading, writing, raising my child, and trying to make a living.

Small, individual choices like mine won’t magically bring about societal change, but they can open the door to finding out what actually delights us—what brings us joy and satisfaction. I know people who genuinely enjoy their aesthetic upkeep, who find going to the hair salon relaxing, and whose skin-care routine is a way to take pleasure in their own body. If doing any of this felt good to me, I’d do it—although, as Fairyington notes, it might still be useful to question why I found it pleasurable. But I don’t, and so trying to look beautiful feels like a chore, another thing to add to my long to-do list. There’s relief in putting my own aesthetic dissatisfaction aside and worrying, instead, about the far more urgent forms of ugliness in the world.

The Writers Who Wrote The Most in History

"The world is indeed full of peril, and in it there are many dark places; but still there is much that is fair, and though in all lands love is now mingled with grief, it grows perhaps the greater." — J.R.R. Tolkien, 1954



Design Blogs …


Bringing a taste of NYC's after-dark dining culture to a subterranean Bondi Junction space, The Hideaway is keen to offer locals something a little different. Tucked into a basement along Spring Street, this restaurant and cocktail bar will undoubtedly look the part, having completed a multi-million dollar transformation. Once a rather ordinary spot, the venue is now an energetic underground retreat channelling old-world steakhouses and dimly lit bars.

Entering via a dual staircase, the experience is intended to be multi-layered, where a top-notch restaurant and bar exist alongside an expansive live music space ripe for evocative evenings set to live blues and jazz. And with music complementing, not dominating the space, the venue is envisaged as a much-needed spot in the Eastern Suburbs that elegantly combines upscale dining, drinks and live music, all at the same time.

2026 AD - The Hideaway Is Bondi Junction's Underground Hangout for Late-Night Supper, Caviar Martinis and Nonchalant Jazz

2026 AD - Just Opened - The Hideaway, Bondi


 The Writers Who Wrote The Most in History. “Corin Tellado published more than 4,000 novels, mostly under a contract with Spanish publisher Bruguera, which obligated her to deliver a 76-page novel every single week for years.”


Twenty Square Meters. Everything You Actually Need.

Cabin Devin is a 20 square meter off-grid retreat perched above the Zlaty Roh vineyards near Bratislava, designed by Ark-Shelter and Archekta. It sits above Devin Castle with uninterrupted views across the vines toward the Austrian Alps, and it operates year-round without any connection to mains services. 


Before aerodynamics were a defining feature of car design, Tatra was already building the most technically sophisticated vehicles in the world. The T87 arrived in 1936 with a wind-cheating body, a rear mounted air cooled magnesium V8, a backbone chassis, fully independent suspension at all four corners, and a drag coefficient of 0.36. In 1936. Ferdinand Porsche's Volkswagen shared so many of its principles that Tatra sued and won. Only 3,056 were built across the entire production run. Fewer than 250 are believed to survive.

This particular example, chassis 79317, has a history that reads like a Cold War novel. In 1976 a 24 year old German enthusiast crossed the Iron Curtain into Czechoslovakia and tracked the car down to an owner in Frydek Mistek who was still using it as a winter daily driver. Buying it was straightforward. Getting it out was not. An export tax equal to the car's value, two years of negotiations, and repeated border rejections later, the T87 finally crossed the Iron Curtain in 1979 under its own power, driving the 1,000 kilometres back to Hannover.

In 2001 the owner sent it home to the Czech Republic for a complete ground up restoration by ECORRA in Koprivnice, the world's foremost specialists in these machines. The original colour combination of dark green over green leather was confirmed through the Tatra factory museum. Custom leather was supplied by Aresma in Hamburg, period correct headlining and carpets sourced by the owner. Body, paint, and mechanicals were completely overhauled. Twenty three years after completion, the panel fitment and paint remain at a level that would embarrass many leading European restoration workshops.

The car passed to its second German owner in southern Bavaria in 2016 and has been carefully maintained and exercised since. It is now available through Schaltkulisse in Munich at an undisclosed price. Jay Leno, who owns one, has called the T87 the greatest car that nobody has ever heard of. That description is becoming harder to sustain as these machines increasingly command the attention their engineering always deserved.


1950 Tatra T87 Aerodynamic Saloon Restored by ECORRA


Part of it depends on whether they believe personality is fixed or constantly changing.


Scientist wins $100,000 prize for decoding birdsong

The Guardian: “A scientist who decoded the dictionary that a bird uses to communicate has won a $100,000 prize for making progress towards a world in which humans can talk to the animals – without being met with a blank response. 

Dr Julie Elie at the University of California, Berkeley, was awarded the 2026 Coller-Dolittle prize for two-way interspecies communication after working out the 11 core calls in the zebra finch vocabulary and their meanings. Her work revealed how the birds announce who they are and what they are doing, and recognise one another regardless of what they are saying by using individual signatures. 

She also found that at times, the birds confused calls with similar meanings more than those that sounded the same. “I’m really super-honoured,” Elie said on winning the prize, adding that she hoped the work was a step forwards in the “great endeavour” to communicate with animals. Prof Yossi Yovel, a zoologist at Tel Aviv University and chair of the panel of judges, said the work marked “a key moment in the field”. 

The prize was launched in 2024 by the Jeremy Coller Foundation, which promotes awareness of animal welfare and animal sentience, in partnership with Tel Aviv University. Beyond the annual prizes for progress, the foundation has established a $10m grand prize for cracking the problem of two-way human-animal communication. Elie decided to study zebra finches because they are so vocal – meaning they produce plenty of data.

 “The question I asked myself when hearing these chatty songbirds was what are they saying?” she said. For more than a decade, Elie observed and recorded the sounds the birds made and classified the calls according to the situation and the bird that made them. 

She then used machine learning to analyse what and how information was encoded in the calls. Finally, she ran tests that showed the birds agreed with her classification…”


Who is hiring search

“Every month since 2011, Hacker News runs an “Ask HN: Who is hiring?” thread where each top-level comment is one job posting. Chart how often a language, tool or work-style shows up across those postings – a live read on what the tech job market actually asks for. Chart how often a language, tool or work-style shows up across those postings – a live read on what the tech job market actually asks 

Saturday, July 04, 2026

Spit and no polish - How gold became the symbol of Donald Trump’s second term



Downunder - Sydney Morning Herald: How gold became the symbol of Donald Trump’s second term

Donald Trump has been busy. Not necessarily in ways you’d imagine. One morning, his press secretary walked into the Oval Office to find the president “clutching a tube of superglue and attempting to affix gold decorations to the marble fireplace mantel”.

Trump is quite obsessed with interior decoration, and one of his particular decor fixations is a devotion to gold. The real metal, but the mere appearance of gold, too.

He’d respected the traditional understatement of Oval Office ornamentation in his first term but, in his second, “would unleash his inner Louis XIV”, write Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman in their new bookRegime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump.

US President Donald Trump is quite obsessed with interior decoration, and one of his particular fixations is gold.MATT WILLIS

“I actually hadn’t been in there for a while,” Swan tells me, until March this year when he and Haberman were allowed an interview, “and you just walk in, and it’s almost overwhelming, like the inside of a jewellery box from every direction. It’s pretty amazing.”


Trump pinched a set of golden table centrepieces that Melania liked to keep in the residence and took them to his office. He found antique gold urns in the White House collection, put them on the office mantelpiece and called them “cash”.

Why? Because, Trump says, “people look at it and all they see is cash”, write Swan, an Australian, and Haberman, both reporters at The New York Times.

Supplicants know how to take advantage of this fetish. A visiting Swiss business delegation handed Trump a gold bar worth $130,000 and a custom-made gold-plated Rolex desk clock in November.

The following week, his administration cut the tariff on Swiss imports from 39 per cent to 15. Coincidence, said the White House.


Technically, the gifts were given to Trump’s presidential library, but guess who gets to use them at his pleasure? Trump’s insatiable venality is one of the themes covered in the reporters’ book.

Financial disclosures on Wednesday show that his income burgeoned nearly threefold to $US2.2 billion last year with his return to the presidency. The Wall Street Journal described this as his clan “cashing in on the presidency in big and sketchy ways”.

The gold theme illuminates much about Trump, the president who launched a line of Trump-branded, gold-coloured runners for $US399 a pair the day after a court ordered him to pay $US349.5 million for fraudulently inflating his true wealth. He has his own special gold buyer.

The authors’ gold-dazzled visit to the Oval Office revealed other ways that Trump has been busy. Haberman and Swan had a list of detailed questions they wanted him to answer to support their reporting for the book. They didn’t get the answers.

But they were surprised to find that, with his Iran war in its 17th day, “the war seemed the furthest thing from Trump’s mind,” they write. “On the Resolute Desk, instead of a map of the Middle East, were printouts of maple trees.” Trump was selecting some for the garden. “I know how to buy good trees,” he informed them.


Next, he showed the reporters a printout of his TikTok statistics showing 339 billion all-time views of Trump and boasted: “Can you believe?” Then it was on to details of the ballroom he’s building, and another boast as he pointed out that its columns would be bigger than those of the Supreme Court.

Six American air force personnel had been killed in his war four days earlier. And six army reservists in the days before. His shameless self-indulgence in trivia at such a moment is shocking. But, as Swan and Haberman argue, “his complete absence of shame – historically unusual among American presidents – has been a political superpower.”

The New York Times reporters Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan.DOUG MILLS/NEW YORK TIMES

The significance of gold to Trump leads beyond the precious metal itself. Because it was at its modern apex in the 19th century, the time of the so-called classical gold standard. And so were Trump’s other signature preoccupations – tariffs and territory.

He acquires gold and bathes in its glow at every opportunity, just as he covets territory and imposes tariffs in a way no other American leader has in a century.


“I actually think Trump has a sort of 19th century view of the world,” says Swan, a former reporter for this masthead who has been covering Trump for 11 years. “When he looks at a map of the western hemisphere, and he sees these large stretches of land, like Greenland, Canada, Venezuela, he doesn’t see sovereign countries, he sees land that really ought to belong to the US.”

Trump’s increasingly regional view, while retreating from NATO, raises the question of whether the US is retrenching from its century as a global superpower.

This recalls the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, when President James Monroe declared the western hemisphere to be America’s sphere of influence. But that was its only sphere of influence.

Trump wages war in the Middle East, too. But is he committed to maintaining US power in the central theatre of the world economy and population – the Indo-Pacific? Or does he see it as China’s sphere?

The question is in the balance. He once likened Taiwan to a pen tip and China to the Resolute Desk. He’s called it a “bargaining chip” to use with China.


Swan’s close-up, 11-year study of Trump leads him to believe that no country, no ally, should expect US support in a crisis: “So, you know, it’s not like you can depend on it in a sort of predictable treaty-based way. It would be based on Trump’s own feelings about the leader, the personal, he’s very much a personalist leader, and you know, based on how he’s feeling that week or that day.”

The president’s attachment to tariffs is another central theme of the self-described “tariff man”. Again, the tariff was at its apogee in the 19th century. It was discredited in the early 20th.

Trump single-handedly brought the tariff back into fashion, with disastrous results as it fed inflation at home and alienated allies and friends abroad.

But, as with everything Trump touches, whether territory or tariff or otherwise, the hallmark style of Trump’s government is constant and, sometimes, calculated chaos.


For instance, when Trump invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into the Situation Room to pitch his Iran war, he excluded his treasury secretary and his energy secretary.

The Iranians, of course, instantly turned the US-Israeli attack into a war of energy and economics and Trump was utterly unprepared. At the end of Netanyahu’s hour-long sales job, report the Times’ journalists, Trump, apparently satisfied, sat back and declared: “Sounds good to me.”

And, inexcusably, he brushed aside the repeated advice from the chairman of the joint chiefs that the Iranians could close the Strait of Hormuz.

Or when Trump was preparing his plan to impose worldwide tariffs on so-called Liberation Day and he realised that he’d forgotten to include the country that was ostensibly the main target – China. “Where are they?” he asked. Then, off the top of his head: “Put them in for 10” per cent.

Some of the chaos is calculated, say Swan and Haberman, because Trump uses it as a control tool.


For instance, his special envoy to end the Russia-Ukraine war, retired army general Keith Kellogg, was presenting a plan for applying pressure to Russia when the president shut him down.

Trump told him he was forbidden to speak to the Russians. Bizarrely, the man tasked with negotiating an end to the war was banned from contact with the aggressor: “Because we’re working a deal.”

“Trump enjoyed toying with people and operated in a culture of secrecy,” write the authors. “There would never be clear lines of authority or command, other than from Trump himself.”

Even though his daily online postings create the appearance of a radical new presidential transparency, in truth they are the surface spectacle.


His controversial choice to turn over the White House lawns to a UFC gauntlet of violence last month, for example, was a marketing opportunity for the president to appeal to the predominantly young men who follow the martial sport. Spectacular yet stage-managed.

But it has its hidden analogue in the private places within the executive mansion, as the book reveals. In his heady days of unchecked DOGE, Elon Musk had fired the head of the US tax office, the Internal Revenue Service, and appointed his own man with the brief to halve the size of the agency.

But the IRS is under the jurisdiction of the Treasury. And its secretary, a Wall Street billionaire, Scott Bessent, was unimpressed. “F--k you!” he told Musk in an Oval Office confrontation, according to the book. Musk goaded him to say it more loudly. And he did.

As they left the president’s office, “the situation got physical”, the authors write. “Musk lowered his shoulder into Bessent, and there was a shove.”

Organised violence on the lawn between paid brawlers is one thing. But physical contests for dominance between the people responsible for running the government on behalf of 300 million citizens? The president, rather than calling them to order, only asked one question, the book reports. “Who won?” In the more meaningful contest over policy, Trump eventually named Bessent as winner and DOGE, discredited, was disbanded.


For a foreign leader seeking to manage this chaotic regime, what’s the best approach. I asked John Howard whether he’d hang back to avoid risk, as Anthony Albanese does, or engage more?

“I’d engage,” said the Americaphilic former prime minister. “But I don’t know that it’d do any good.”

Swan concurs. It might help in the short run, he ventures, but it wouldn’t bank any credit for future use. “The bank could be raided overnight; it’s very situational.”

Trump’s America, a recrudescence of the late 19th century Gilded Age, so named by Mark Twain for its superficial gold coating over a rotten interior, is to be endured, not managed, by US allies.


Peter HartcherPeter Hartcher is political editor and international editor of The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.Connect via email.