Central to Donald Trump’s approach to international relations is an inability to grasp the basis of America’s postwar power – a mistake Australia must confront for its own security. By Michael Wesley.
The United States emerged from World War II the wealthiest and most powerful state the world has ever seen.
In the second half of the 1940s, it had two thirds of the world’s gold reserves, half the world’s manufacturing capacity and one third of all global exports.
At war’s end, US factories were producing one ship a day. Half of all world shipping was American. The US was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons and was streets ahead of any other nation in developing military technology, from jet fighters to aircraft carriers, to submarines and advanced rocketry.
America’s leaders pondered the challenge of what to do with all this power. They were determined to avoid the mistakes made after World War I, when the US dismantled its military, retreated to its own continental isolation and threw up trade barriers to the rest of the world.
The result, they believed, had been depression, disorder and fascist or communist dictatorships, plunging the world into the most destructive war in history.
The conundrum was how to maintain and grow American power in the cause of global stability and prosperity. Their answer was to embed US power in a network of institutions designed to build order and prosperity: the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Bank, NATO, ANZUS, international law, and the International Court of Justice.
Germany and Japan were rehabilitated and rebuilt, firmly entrenched in a global alliance system centred on Washington, DC.
At the core of this proposition was that other countries would benefit from US-guaranteed order and economic prosperity in exchange for accepting and supporting America’s extraordinary power.
It was a deal readily accepted by most other countries. Dozens lined up to become US treaty allies, benefiting from and bolstering American power in Latin America, East and South-East Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
They joined US-based international institutions – the UN, World Bank, IMF – in droves.
In exchange for widespread acknowledgement that US power was good for the world, Washington accepted restraints on how American power would be used.
Of course, it wasn’t perfect. Overreach was always a temptation for such a powerful military paired with a strong commitment to spreading democracy and free markets.
Intervention and subversion to further American interests occurred in Latin America, the Middle East, South-East Asia and Africa.
There was, however, always a powerful corrective response – particularly when overreach led to the deadly quagmire of the Vietnam War – which saw Washington recommit to order-bolstering institutions.
The American deal was rejected by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which worked to undermine US power and weaken the willingness of other countries to sign on to the American deal.
Theirs was an alternative vision of global order and production that gained few genuine, unforced followers. Even newly decolonised states, when given the choice between American order and alignment with the communist bloc, rarely chose the latter.
Ultimately, the US managed to forestall for 80 years one of the oldest patterns in international relations: the tendency for other countries to align against an overwhelming power centre, with the intention of balancing it.
By shackling its power to the cause of global stability and prosperity, the US escaped the formation of a balancing coalition to oppose its interests – even with a rival superpower actively encouraging such an opposing coalition.
Most of the countries that opted for non-alignment became passive beneficiaries of American-guaranteed stability.
The ultimate achievement of postwar American foreign policy was that its power grew with each ally Washington acquired, and with the growing legitimacy of the global institutions it founded.
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Europe and East Asia developed quickly under the US security guarantee, creating dynamic markets and high-technology manufacturing networks that added to America’s power and wealth.
Once the Cold War ended, the US power lead became clearer: it was truly the “indispensable nation” – as former secretary of state Madeleine Albright described it – its attention and approval sought in all regions of the globe.
It is now clear that Donald Trump didn’t get this memo. He took charge of a superpower whose authority in the world had been built over eight decades of fostering trust and goodwill internationally. He interpreted America’s allies’ willingness to accept and support US power as evidence of weakness and exploitation rather than a foundation for American strength.
His determination to use US national power in the same way he wields corporate power is diametrically opposed to how postwar America has socialised other states to support its power and authority. It will have profound effects on the future of American power and world order.
The deliberate weakening of international institutions, flouting of international law, disrespect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, wilful humiliation of allies, abrupt ending of US development aid and rehabilitation of the prime disrupter of international stability are having a powerful, corrosive effect on all of the features Washington has built to convince the world of the benign nature of American power.
The demand that Denmark hand over Greenland, Panama give up the Panama Canal and Ukraine cede rights to its mineral and energy wealth to recompense American assistance are acts of ruthless self-interest. They have led the foreign affairs minister of normally circumspect Singapore to liken Trump’s America to a “greedy landlord”.
If Trump thinks ending US commitments to its European and Asian allies or forcing them to pay humiliating tribute to him in order to maintain their security guarantees will enhance American power, he is dead wrong.
Nothing will erode US authority, influence and security faster than destroying other countries’ respect for and trust in America.
In forcing allies to become more self-reliant and allowing competitors room to expand their influence, he is creating a world more resistant to American influence and de-aligned from US interests.
Given how much consternation Trump has caused in the first month of this second term, imagine how extensive the damage will be to trust in the US after four years of this. No amount of post-Trump correction will rebuild the basis of America’s postwar power and authority, either among US allies or in non-allied countries.
Trump mistakes intimidation, swagger and the intentional humiliation of others for power. He sees those who rely on US support and reciprocity, such as Ukraine, Canada and Mexico, as most vulnerable to coercion and threats.
His diatribes against Volodymyr Zelensky are intended to intimidate others into not challenging him, lest they incur his wrath and retribution. His vice-president’s demand that European countries embrace their parties on the populist right in order to maintain the goodwill of Washington comes from the same playbook.
The threats of across-the-board tariffs and of reviewing US participation in every international agreement to which it is a party signal a superpower uninterested in anything beyond its own narrow advantage. These actions go beyond destroying others’ trust – they are likely to stimulate disengagement and ultimately resistance to the US.
The Australian government’s response, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been the same as the Coalition’s approach to the first Trump presidency: to work bilaterally to ensure that Australia escapes the direct effect of punitive measures such as tariffs and to ensure the alliance remains unaffected.
This approach concentrates on preserving the specific material and strategic benefits of the alliance to Australia’s security, but the government must also recognise that even if it succeeds in insulating the bilateral relationship from the wrath of Trump, our foreign policy challenges will still be significant.
Our closest ally is trashing the international norms and institutions that have benefited Australia for 80 years, fostering a stable and prosperous region in which Australia is deeply integrated, institutionally and economically.
Trump’s campaign against the underpinnings of the rules-based order that we have been championing opens the door to the construction of an alternative order, centred on China – an order that will be deeply uncomfortable for Australia and our political values.
Other countries that want to preserve the rules-based order – in Europe, Asia and the Americas – will be asking Canberra how willing it will be to anger its close ally to stand in solidarity with them.
As we have seen with the US volte-face on Ukraine, there will be situations in which Australia will have to choose between solidarity with the Europeans, Japanese and Canadians and keeping our heads down to preserve the US relationship.
Australia will also have to deal with the substantial collateral reputational damage that will accrue to a close ally of the superpower that is trashing international norms and institutions while humiliating smaller countries and cosying up to assertive great powers.
Our alliance will be increasingly a diplomatic liability in the age of Trump, meaning we will have to work harder on relationships with our neighbours to contain the damage.
Ultimately, the second Trump presidency must trigger a fundamental rethink of our alliance.
Is it wise to think the alliance is built on shared values? Does increasing integration with a military whose strategic intent is unclear and inherently unpredictable a good idea?
What is the appropriate balance between our immediate security needs and a broader values-based commitment to the rules-based order?
These are profound questions that the next Australian government cannot avoid.
This article was first published in the print edition of The Saturday Paper on March 1, 2025 as "What the US miscalculates about the source of its power".
