Dirty habits die hard
Interesting thing about contextual fame: to the surprise of bookstores, Craig Mod has sold out every appearance on his book tourfor Things Become Other Things. But he couldn’t get a single store in Portland or Boston to host a reading.
RUSSIA needs a strong leader, able to get laws passed and obeyed, and institutions built, rebuilt or cleansed of corruption. Vladimir Putin, its new president, seems a strong, determined man, supported since parliamentary elections in December by a fairly robust majority in the Duma, and standing a fine chance of being elected as president in the popular vote that is now due on March 26th. So Mr Putin is just what the Russian doctor ordered? Not so fast. Before jumping to that conclusion, it is as well to review what is known about this man and his supporters.
By the standards of a secretive, clannish place, Mr Putin's background is fairly clear (see article) but that still does not make him well-known. The trouble is that the few facts that are available reveal little about his political inclinations or his ideas about policy. Since he became prime minister just over four months ago, and especially since becoming president last week, he has made sure to offer reassuring noises to all the appropriate constituencies: to sound democratic to democrats, reform-minded to reformers, tough to tough-guys, reasonably western to reasonable westerners. But it is not what he says that matters. It is what he does. And most of the significant things that he has done, both in his short career as a political leader and in his longer career as a spy, have been scary.
The case for suspicion
It is in that longer career that the worries begin. In any country, it would be hard to imagine the former head of the domestic counter-intelligence service becoming president. George Bush may have been head of America's CIA, but that was a political appointment and he was not a career spy. In Russia, you might argue, everyone who is anyone has a dodgy background of some sort, given seven decades of communism. And in lawless Russia, to have the trust of the secret police and the army will be a big help. All that is true. But a more sinister interpretation is just as plausible.
For much of this year, the role and influence of the secret police and the army have been on the rise. Humiliated by Russia's failed war in Chechnya in 1994-96, derided around the globe for years as a clapped out bunch of incompetents, the Russian army has long been looking for a way to restore its pride and morale. Last year's NATO offensive in Kosovo left Russia looking both unprepared and fourth-rate, apparently incapable of defending interests or standing by allies. This was an exaggeration, but one the security services and the military appear to have exploited to begin their comeback. Then, following the incursion by Chechen rebels into neighbouring Dagestan in the summer came a series of deadly bomb explosions in Moscow and other Russian cities. This was the beginning, remember, of Mr Putin's rise to power and popularity.
No clear evidence has yet been found for who was responsible for those bombs, and no one has claimed responsibility. Chechen rebels, which include some pretty nasty characters, may well have been the culprits. But, in the absence of evidence, other candidates should also be kept in mind. One of them is the very service that Mr Putin used to head, once the core of the KGB and now called the FSB. There is no evidence that it laid the bombs, either. Yet given the huge benefits that he, and the security forces in general, have gained from those tragedies it would be foolish to rule that thought out altogether. What is clear is that this possibility needs to be weighed in any assessment of what a long-term President Putin might be like.
Yeltsin's happy new year
In a different way, the manner of President Yeltsin's resignation was also ominous. There is no doubt that it was long overdue; Mr Yeltsin would have done his country a service by standing down at least two years ago. But there is also a lot of doubt over whether he really wanted to stand down even six months before the end of his term. A deal to protect him and his family from prosecution for corruption, struck with a powerful prospect in the forthcoming elections, may be explanation enough. But it did not look terribly voluntary, and despite gestures of change in the Kremlin (such as the ostentatious sidelining of Mr Yeltsin's daughter) the signs are that the same court of business oligarchs and security toughs will be running things in future. Mr Yeltsin was, at least in his last years, their puppet (see article). Which end of the strings Mr Putin holds remains to be seen.
There are, to be sure, better possibilities. Out of the Putin-strengthening evil of the Chechen war could come institution-building, rule-of-law-enforcing, enterprise-creating good. President Putin may indeed believe, as he says he does, in an open society, with free speech, democratic liberties and pro-market reforms. His desire to crush the Chechen rebels may, in due course, be tempered by a realpolitik desire to stay on reasonable terms with the Islamic world. His desire to stand up for Russia against the West may be tempered by a realpolitik desire to keep open Russia's access to foreign money and to avoid outright confrontations with America.
All this suggests that outsiders and Russians alike should give President Putin the benefit of the doubt. They should keep an open mind, certainly. But for the moment, the sobering truth is that the facts—such as they are, given that he is a former spymaster—lean more towards doubt than benefit.
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “Putin the Great Unknown”