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Saturday, November 02, 2019

Myths and Realities of Administering Australian Parliaments



Myths and Realities of
Administering Australian
Parliaments
Comments on the Foley-Russell Report
R. L. Cope Legislative Studies,  Spring -  1992

The appearance of the Strategic Management
Review of the Parliament of
Victoria (the Foley-Russell Report
1991) should promote a deeper consideration
of a number of issues, some very
confused, about how the Australian parliaments
organise and manage their own staffs
and services.! Too little public and scholarly
attention has been paid in Australia to the
changes taking place in the bureaucratic management
of the parliaments, especially in the
States.2 The process has admittedly been
uneven, and there does not seem to be any
generally acceptable 'doctrine'. The reasons
for these changes are in part a response to
members' perception that the organisation is
not supporting their needs adequately, but
more generally the changes are part of the
process of restructuring sweeping the public
sector. The belief that what works in the
private sector should work in the public
sector, a belief dressed in appropriate 'philosophical'
terminology, has swept over the
various public services, but parliaments, until
recently, have been largely shielded from the
full impact of these innovations. It remains a
moot question to what extent the norms
determining changes i~ the public sector at
large are applicable to legislatures.
Changes in public sector management
arise from a new philosophy of public administration
stressing effectiveness, efficiency and
accountability. 
New tools to achieve these
desirable goals are proposed. Traditional
structures and controls have been replaced
(public service boards abolished, senior executive
services with performance norms and
contracts introduced), financial and budgetary
procedures have been modernised,
accountability measures and performance
goals have been put in place (corporate and
strategic plans are required, annual reporting
norms have been strengthened), and
emphasis is placed on improving staff skills
and career opportunities.3 Increasingly these
and other public sector requirements are
being extended to parliaments where some of
them are long overdue.
The need to upgrade the organisational
framework and the performance of the parliamentary
bureaucracies seems clear enough if
the public perception of Australian legislatures
is to improve. The Report of the
Queensland Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) is
important, amongst other things, for its
remarks on the effectiveness of the parliamentary
institution. 
Recommendations having a
bearing on its internal management and
organisation are made which have a relevance
for other States as well. Of course, there
is an even more important need for the
members and governments to play a role
which does not undermine the institution
itself. In this context, the Queensland example
n~eds no elaboration. In New South Wales
Premier Wran never hid his disdain for parliament:
he used it as suited his policies, but
he never valued or respected it as such.
Examples such as this can have a very pervasive
force especially when coupled with
media reaction.

Why is change needed
The need for mOTe effective legislative
bureaucracies and better provision of support
services are clearly recognised by parliamentarians
who are all too well aware of their
increasing workloads and of an electorate
becoming more knowledgeable, questioning
and politically unreliable. Without excellent
information and other support services
members cannot hope to keep even modestly
abreast of the issues (often socially divisive)
now so characteristic of political life. 
The rise
of single-issue movements has also added to
the stress of political and parliamentary life.
The game is harder and members need access
to a range of specialised support services, not
just for parliamentary debate and electorat~
needs, but for policy discussion and formulation
within their own parties as well.
Members, particularly if in Opposition, need
the" parliamentary organisation to help them
cope. The parliamentary bureaucracies, especially
in the Australian States, have not been
notable for planning to meet changing institutional
needs. Indeed, some members would
claim that there is a lack of response to
existing needs, much less any capacity or will
to anticipate or provide for future needs.
The Foley-Russell Report was debated in
the Victorian Parliament and received a
modest amount of press notice. The parliamentary
discussion was not very penetrating
and almost entirely ignored the suggestions
for internal bureaucratic restructuring. 
An article by Sir Rupert Hamer (entitled 'Parliament
in Crisis' (Herald-Sun, March 22, 1991)
criticised the report for overlooking two principal
reasons for the decline of Parliament:
rigidity of the party system and the development
of the electronic media. Sir Rupert's"
remarks focus on surface issues. Other
comment concentrated obsessively on the
question of parliamentary control of its own
budget. By far the most sensible comment on
this emotive question was made by the Hon.
G. P. Connard M.L.e.: '
There is no doubt that
a measure of discipline has to be exercised by
the Treasurer in making the appropriation for
Parliament, but those things can be worked
out' (Parliamentary Debates (Legislative
Council), 10 April 1991, 607).
The Victorian Legislative Council
approved a motion tor the establishment of a
joint Select Committee to inquire into and
report upon all the issues and recommendations
contained in the Foley-Russell Report. If
that joint select committee becomes operative,
its minutes of evidence should be a valuable
source of information on many questions of
wide relevance to all Australian parliaments.
Changing Parliamentary Bureaucracies
When changes are proposed to the internal
structure and management of a legislature, it
is always worth giving a thought to the
motives of those making the proposal as well
as to the motives of those who have to implement
the changes. Of course it is not always
easy to determine motives, but shrewd surmises
can be made.
Neville Wran was fond of the saying: 'Bet
on self-interest, it is always a sure winner'.
This piece of homely _wisdom is worth
bearing in mind when contemplating the
question of the way the legislature's organisation
and services might be changed. The
number of players whose self-interest is
involved should be considered carefully.
Good reports may fail if they ignore homely
wisdom: It is not yet clear what fate awaits
the Foley-Russell Report.
It is noteworthy that most reports on possible
changes to parliamentary administration
and internal management have been conducted
by outsiders so as to avoid suggestions
of bias and self-interest. One possible
drawback of this is that parliaments are
organisations quite unlike any other: they do
not fit into organisational schemes as generally
understood. Their 'corporate culture' is
not easily accessible to outsiders. This may at
first seem an odd claim in view of the extensive
literature on parliaments,· but that literature
is predominantly concerned with the
political and procedural aspects, not with the
structural administrative ones. 
However that
may be, the fact that a number of inquiries
into parliamentary administrative matters
conducted by outside 'experts' have failed to
be implemented in the way recommended
may be explained, at least in part, by their
inability (perhaps never even realised) to
penetrate beyond the 'public' face to the underlying
reality. This is a complex matter not
easily analysable, being part anecdotal and
variable according to time, place and personalities
involved.
The Foley-Russell Report has as its
authors Dr K. J. Foley, who was for a period a
member of parliaJ11ent (and hence, one
assumes, something of an insider), and Prof~
ssor E. W. Russell, Executive Director,
Public Sector Management Institute, Monash
University. The Report is very readable and is
designed and organised with a flair not characteristic
of official reports. It has a lively, personal
tone expressing concern and
occasionally indignation at deficiencies of the
Victorian Parliament. It is in the best sense a
'passionate' document, which enhances its
readability. Because it raises key issues and
expresses strongly held opinions, it is also a
work which deserves to become a widely
used text tor students of political science. It is
ideal for this purpose, being readable and
inviting response (positive and negative).
A Report of the Victorian AuditorGeneral's
Office entitled Assessment of the
Administration of the Departments which Support
the Activities of Parliament (]987) forms an
interesting companion-piece to the FoleyRussell
Report.4 The Auditor-General's
Report is scathing about managerial deficiencies
and the lack of proper staffing policies,
especially as regards performance. Much of
what is said about the Victorian Parliament
might, we suggest, be said with equal validity
about other Australian parliaments. But one
hastens to add that some of the AuditorGeneral's
criteria are open to strong question.
He is applying an outsider's norms to a situation
which requires the knowledge, experience
and, especially, the psychological insight
of an insider. 
Anyone who has ever worked
in a parliament would smile to read the
Report's paragraph 4.3.7 dealing with Parliamentary
Committees: '(2) Lines of authority
and communication between Directors of
Research, Committee Secretaries and Parliamentary
administration were not fully understood
by all officers'. There is, of course, a
whole history here ~aiting for the pen of a Sir
Lewis Namier!
Several other passages from the AuditorGeneral's
Report should be quoted because
they are relevant to the consideration of the
Foley-Russell Report.
4.1.1 (4) Officers appointed to senior positions
have usually developed skills only
in limited area of activity, Le., table
officer, parliamentary reporter, etc. As a
consequence, they may not have had the
opportunity for exposure to a wide-range
of mid-level managerial activities which
would develop the skills required of a
senior executive.
These remarks may be fair enough, but
unless the context and realities of the organisation
are clearly understood, the points
made above may be purely rhetorical. How
many people, for example, are being spoken
of? What is meant by 'mid-level managerial
activities' within the structure of the Parliament
of Victoria? What certainty is there that
officers will in fact ever progress to such elevated
levels?
4.1.6 ... Audit (i.e. the surveyor) noted
that with the exception of the Parliamentary
Library and limited statistical data in
other departments, there was little evidence
of the monitoring of activities
through the use of management information
systems, performance evaluations,
and the use of performance indicators. In
audit view, use of such measures would
have assisted in overcoming at an early
stage many of the problems referred to
later in thi? report.
These interesting remarks seem sensible,
but once again their application in the real
context may be utterly fanciful. Without
entering into fuller analysis, it seems clear
that the Auditor-General's Office has pinpointed
obvious deficiencies when measured
against norms (not stated) of efficiency and
effectiveness, but the solutions proposed,
applicable in government departments with a
large workforce and with quite different
structure and corporate culture, may achieve
very little. 
Will the Clerk of the Legislative
Council conduct the performance evaluation
of the Assembly's Clerk? Or will outsiders be
called in to assist? The problem is genuine;
the need tor action may be pressing: but what
is the solution that will work in the real world
of the Parliament of Victoria?
The Foley-Russell Report takes as its
point of departure the Report of the AuditorGeneral's
Office as well as a draft Corporate
Plan prepared in 1990 by the five Parliamentary
Departments. The authors state (p. 19)
that they go beyond the previous documents
by 'fcrussing forwards and outwards on steps
that needed to be taken to ensure the Parliament
is well placed to respond to the
demands which will be placed on it in the
coming decade' [4]. On p. 7 they state: '...
with existing attitudes, structure, resources
and funding processes it appears that the Victorian
Parliament cannot (their emphasis)
fully meet its obligations within the Victorian
constitutional framework'. They fully discuss
the Victorian constitutional framework and
Parliament's place within it. On this basis
they offer their recommendations for remedial
action. They wax particularly eloquent
about Parliament's subservience to the Executive.
On several occasions they refer to the
heinous fact that 'Parliament must go cap in
hand to Treasury public servants to obtain
allocation' (p. 11). This amusing notion is, of
course, a classic instance of setting up straw
men. 
'Treasury public servants', i.e. Treasury
officers, do not approve the allocations: the
Treasurer, Le. an elected parliamentarian,
does. Not all Treasurers are supine creatures
of their public servants! Executive government
entails control of the public purse,
subject to parliamentary processes being met.
But the desire of all Australian parliaments to
have greater control over their own budgets
certainly stands high on their agendas. The
authors are convinced that their view of parliamentary
democracy (separation of powers,
constitutional checks and balances) is
unshakeable: 'fit} underlies our report and is
the foundation for many recommendations,
(p. 13).
Criticising the Queensland Government
for its 'lack of appreciation' of the doctrine of
separation of powers between the branches of
government, the authors 'add the same criticism
can regrettably be levelled at successive
Victorian Governments regardless of political
hue' (p. 13). Is it too far wide of the mark to
say that every Australian government is the
same: differences are matters of degree? It
may well be more relevant to ask whether the
'doctrine' is not in reality a myth which has
little contemporary relevance in the way the
authors state. 
Possibly it was effectively operative
in colonial times, but even that needs
careful analysis. The predominance of the
Executive has several reasons: the foremost
being that political concerns always take
precedence over parliamentary concerns. This
is in fact recognised in a very good passage of
the Report on p. 6 where the authors castigate
the major political parties for lacking a platform
statement or policy on Parliament per se.
Why do they need one if Parliament is basically
an instrument and not some hypostatised
idea? This approach to the nature of
Parliament leads the authors to make the following
bold claim: 'the Presiding Officers (in
the case of the legislative branch) and the
Chief Justice (in the case of the judicial
branch) - each are (i.e. is) conceptually of
equal status to the Premier'. It is not fruitful
to become beguiled by such bizarre notions.
Another reason tor the pre-eminence of
the Executive stems from internal management
deficiencies of the Parliament which has
lacked the necessary skills and resources to
match the administrative competence of the
Executive.
Is Parliament an Organisation?
It may seem strange to pose the question
whether parliament is an organisation. Some
observers would maintain that it is actually a
'congeries of organisations'. The difficulty is
that parliament is a chameleon, and one is
reminded of the problems besetting the
nature of light: is it a wave or a particle? In
other words, parliament is what the viewer
sees it to be and one focus may need to be
qualified in the light of other points of focus.
It is not idle to consider these matters more
deeply because managerial and organisational
concepts flow from what is understood
about the nature of the 'organisation' to be
managed.
The complex nature of parliaments as
continuous administrative organisations are a
subject scarcely touched by researchers and a
study which certainly cannot succeed without
an insider's knowledge. Perhaps a helpful his

torical analogy to the nature of a parliament is
found in the small princedoms of eighteenthcentury
Germany. Many of the same elements
are present: autocratic rule tempered by hidebound
bureaucratic and judicial procedures
and attitudes, court intrigues and the kaleidoscope
of personal relations and favourites, as
well as more positive features which may
even embrace the public good. That personal
and psychological factors are heavily
weighted in such an environment states the
obvious. It can be a strength as well as a
weakness. 
Certainly the hothouse and sometimes
hermetically sealed atmosphere of a
parliament, especially bicameral ones, makes
psychological factors very powerful. They are
not admittedly unknown in other organisations
as well, but they assume a peculiar
intensity and pervasiveness within legislatures.
Indeed the psychology of power is
perhaps the greatest force active in any parliament.
The authors understandably do not
mention it, although they would be aware of
its existence.
The authors accept that parliament as an
organisation should have a mission statement
and a list of objectives. These are dealt with
on pp. 24-27. They plead for the political
parties to prepare policy statements on parliament
and advocate a joint sitting of both
Houses 'in a bipartisan climate' to adopt an
appropriate mission statement. They offer a
model statement which is in line with their
assumptions about how the Parliament 'is
intended to function' in our system of parliamentary
government (p. 25). But this is to beg
the question: how it is 'intended' to function
does not necessarily mean that is how it actually
functions, or can indeed ever hope to
function.
The objectives for the Parliament (p. 27)
are well worth reading, and though offering
some counsels of perfection, could provide
useful pointers for other parliaments as well.
But the applicability of missions and objectives
must be measured against the nature of
the organisation and, as pointed out above,
parliament as an organisation presents peculiar
difficulties which standard organisation
theory is not equipped to handle very readily.
Strategies for Implementing
Change
To implement the objectives proposed the
authors recommend a range of strategic measures.
First of all, they advocate a 'process by
which Members of Parliament and the staff of
Parliament discuss and develop a consensus
on these objectives' (p. 28).5 It is, however, not
clear what this proposal really means: who
are the staff? How is the discussion to
proceed? Does consensus really mean that
Members might be expected to concede
points to the staff? The sentiment is laudable,
but its nature is essentially vague. Do the lion
and the lamb actually ever sit down together?
Their principal suggestion, based on the
notion that the Executive has submerged the
Legislature, raises the issue of parliament
prosecuting an energetic role as guardian of
public accountability and thus demonstrating
its 'relevance' (p. 29). They state:
We suggest that 1991 be devoted [to an
intensive process to raise public understanding
of the Constitution and of Parliament's
role] ... and that a centrepiece
of it be the creation of a parliamentary
education function.
 The task the strategy
requires can be helped by that function,
but the essential task belongs to the Parliamentarians,
and their commitment to it
will determine its success or failure.
Few will deny that parliament needs to
carry out an education function, starting vvith
its own staff and the members themselves.
The authors make excellent points on this
issue. Next it might be suggested that media
representatives, sometimes lamentably ignorant
about basics, be targeted. Parliament can
scarcely be successful in its efforts if television
broadcasters watched by multitudes convey
distorted or even wrong impressions, not so
much by intent as from pure old-fashioned
ignorance. Obviously we need a fleshing-out
of this idea. It is well worth more analysis.
The authors do not propose any costs or give
other than a general admonition.
Accountability
The theme of accountability, that is, of the
Executive to the Legislature, is a major
element in the Report and recent develop
ments in Queensland, to mention but one
example, lend weight to the concern for real
parliamentary powers of accountability.
There is also reference to the need for parliamentary
departments to issue annual reports
and provide some accountability of their
activities. Nowhere could I see mention of
accountability of members for their activities
and expenditures. This hereticai suggestion
would sink any report, but it should not be
pretended that members are any different
from other mortals when it comes to money.
Recent revelations that some NSW
members and ministers amass enormous
unpaid parliamentary refreshment room
accounts have surfaced. Sensitivities become
acute when questions of this kind arise.
Queensland had a few years ago a flurry
about the fairly common abuse of the air warrants
system.6 A former leading federal
member spent a fabulous sum on postage for
electioneering purposes: is he alone in this
practice? It usually needs a 'whistleblower' to
let us know. While most members would be
scrupulous, the damage done to the reputation
of the parliamentary institution and to
members generally by the unscrupulous few
because of the lack of genuine accountability
can be great.
It is this iack of self-accountabiiity on the
part of members which makes one alarmed at
the novel suggestion of Foiey-Russell that the
Ombudsman (as well as the Auditor-General
and the Parliament Counsel) be placed within
the organisational structure of parliament.
One of the few real successes in Australian
public administration in recent times has been
the office of Ombudsman. The authors need
to spell out what they mean much more
clearly: the office of Parliamentary Commissioner
(Ombudsman) in the United Kingdom
had considerable difficulties at one time; the
West German counterpart, also attached to
the Legislature, has features which would not
be easily applicable to the State of Victoria. To
accept the authors, naked recommendation
might be a kiss of death to reai independence
and fearless investigation. The same recommendation
about the office of AuditorGeneral
is also not without problems.
It is curious that the auditors-general as a
class have had so little impact in recent years
on drawing attention to the disastrous adventurism
practised with public funds by a
number of governments. They might as well
not have existed. 
There has always been a
certain 'aura' around the office of auditorgeneral,
but that aura may be due for some
objective analysis. Auditors-general seem
mildly effective in criticising deficiencies in
handling funds but their record in raising
questions about whether the funds should
have been sp"~nt in the first place i? less
impressive. This is certainly the case
regarding internal parliamentary expenditures.
Of course there are quicksands here
and one must tread very warily. Would the
office, whose value is potentially so great, be
actually enhanced by becoming an arm of the
parliament? One may be very sceptical
indeed, especially in view of the symptomatic
situation revealed in Queensland. A fearlessly
impartial, independent and self-motivated
office of auditor-general is a most desirable
objective, but to align it with parliaments
with declining reputations and status does
not seem very sensible. 
The pre-conditions
are wanting, nor will they be created until the
authors make more radical recommendations
based on a real knOWledge of how power is
wielded and influence exercised. The remarks
in 7.2.2.2 about the vaiue 6f the AuditorGeneral
and the Audit Office as a constituent
part of the Legislature are nebulous and hard
to take seriously.
With regard to the same suggestion for
the Parliamentary Counsel's office, one must
question the rationale of the view that 'Parliamentary
Counsel also exists primarily to facilitate
the working of Parliament' (p. 31). Is that
reaHy true? It might be thought that the converse
applies equaHy weil. The argumentation
in 7.2.2.3 on this question is based on
presuppositions which need an explicit elaboration.
The recommendation seems doctrinaire
rather than reasonable or even
desirable.
Paragraph 7.2.3 proposes a budgetary
reform allowing Parliament to take control of
its own appropriations. The authors suggest
no checks and balances and in view of their
concern for accountability of the Executive, it
is paradoxicai that they do not appiy the same
thinking to what is simply another way of
spending public money. The idea in itself has
merit, but it too needs to be more fully explicated.
They will not be unaware of the adage
'quis custodiet ipsos custodes?'
It might well be suggested that parliamentary
estimates committees provide a real
avenue for ensuring that the legislature as
well as the executive practise accountability.
In theory that would be so, but no-one
believes that such committees actually desire
to examine the way members' operate, either
as individuals or as committee members.
There are many delicate matters about
members behaviour and activities, known to
insiders but kept private to save embarrassment.
Occasionally obscure'obiter dicta' in
parliamentary debate convey warning signals
understood by insiders but utterly baffling to
anyone else. The realities of political behaviour
means that it is not the done thing for
questioning to touch certain human frailties.
Few would not agree with that policy, provided
the rules are clearly understood. One
would, however, draw the line at criminal
and corrupt behaviour.

The Structure of the Parliamentary Organisation

The section of the Report bearing the above
heading deals with a topiC which has latterly
become fashionable within Australian parliaments.
Some parliaments have created parliamentary
commissions, and others have
introduced their own form of administrative
structure for the Parliament. The FoleyRussell
Report advocates a single Permanent
Head (Director-General) and a centralised
corporate services division for the Parliament
of Victoria. The Director-General will report
to the Presiding Officers and is to 'provide
leadership and managerial cohesiol" to Parliament's
support services' (p. 34). The eight
managerial elements of the structure (which
includes the Ombudsman, etc.) are set out on
p. 34. The Clerks' positions are downgraded
in scope and their control, in theory at least,
becomes more circumscribed. The authors
skate over the thinnest of ice in this section.
Perhaps they have advisedly left their
remarks in such a scanty form. This is a pity
because a full discussion of the role of the
Clerks is pivotal to any consideration of structure
and management.
Also lacking is any analysis of the role of
the Presiding Officers, a topic of fascinating
dimensions and one bristling with difficulties.
The earlier analogy of the eighteenth-century
princedoms is especially relevant in this
context. A study of the 'style' of recent Presiding
Officers across Australia would soon
indicate both the strengths and weaknesses
besetting attempts to improve parliamentary
administration without fundamental review
of the role of the political heads. As long as
political concerns motivate parliamentarians
and Presiding Officers, there cannot fail to be
difficulties in avoiding a clash of parliamentary
and political priorities. Mr Speaker
Rozzoli of NSW, a Speaker who has in a short
time made a strong positive impact on administrative
effectiveness in his Parliament, has
recently published a Paper ventilating the
need tor the speakership to be secure against
the vagaries of political changes and electioneering?
This dilemma of the pre-eminence of
politics over the quite different needs of
stable, reliable and often unexciting administration,
bedevils much of the discussion on
parliamentary effectiveness and efficiency. It
can become perilously close to an attempt to
square the circle, especially if the discussion is
conducted with myths in place of realities.8
Personnel Management
The authors recommend a Parliamentary
Service Committee to determine appointments,
promote staff mobility and be the
guardians of the merit principle and fair
employment practices. No details of its composition
or tenure are given and the proposal
is given as a germ of an idea to be further
developed (7.3.10, p. 36). If the germ becomes
viable, it might also include performance
assessment if that notion is to be seriously
considered. The idea that mobility between
the Parliament and the public sector should
be fostered is interesting, but open to some
doubts. Some would argue that public servants
coming to work in the legislature would
gain new respect and understanding for the
institution; others would claim that such
experience might shatter illusions and cause
cynicism. The parliaments nowadays com
plain of too great a staff turnover. Parliaments
are wonderful stepping stones for careerists!
To be really effective parliaments need staff
with a depth of experience and with a good
corporate memory: turnover does not assist
this, and mobility in and out may bring too
much"disruption. The authors do mention the
relative unattractiveness of parliamentary
salaries and conditions of work: more might
well be done to give career satisfaction to parliamentary
offlcers by improving these, but in
return enhanced qualifications and demonstrated
excellence in performance and commitment
should be required.
The authors make a range of critical
remarks regarding personnel management in
the Victorian Parliament where some nineteenth-
century practices, and, especially, attitudes
seem strongly entrenched. In 9.3 they
advocate selection and promotion strictly on
merit and for staff to 'be more representative
of the wider community in terms of gender,
education, management expertise (po 45).
Unfortunately these sentiments mean little
unless one has a good idea of the range of
positions involved, the skills needed, the
available career prospects, and the like. There
are a great many variables needing consideration,
but that is of course no argument against
change and improvement. The authors do not
comment on the need to get rid of unsuitable
staff although their remarks imply that such
staff exist. It would be disastrous for morale if
new staff are recruited along the rigorous
lines suggested while older senior staff of
little capacity continue to occupy comfortable
niches.
A series of sensible suggestions about
personnel practices is made in chapter 9, but
the suspicion remains that they can avail little
unless a number of other problems are first
cleared up. The authors stress that their key
recommendation for the establishment of a
Parliamentary Service Committee must occur
as the sine qua non, but for reasons already
given above, it is doubtful if that can of itself
really address a problem with such tangled
roots.
The Report's Conclusions
As the study has progressed it has
become clear that the system of govern·
ment in Victoria had not for some time
operated as it should. And with existing
attitudes, structures, resources 'and
funding procedures the Victorian Parlia·
ment cannot fully discharge the role
required of it in the Victorian constitutional
framework. (p. 58)
This quotation neatly packages some of
the main issues. The phrase: 'as it should'
indicates a normative approach which the
next sentence makes clearer. But if one questions
the idealistic view the authors entertain
about the role parliament 'should' play, one's
response to the points they make may well be
quite different from what they would
welcome. They state on p. 59 that the focus of
their study has been 'toward more effective
government in the widest sense'. This is an
approach which no-one could quarrel with
since it is general enough to mean almost anything.
That as a nation we need to do better
does not seem open to question, but who has
the answers?
The Report's final section 'Implementation'
(pp. 62-63) discusses how to proceed:
, ... extensive discussion and debate should
accompany any program to implement our
recommendations, because an improved
understanding among the political community
of the role of Parliament is in our view an
essential precondition of the changes needed,
(p. 62). Perhaps the authors mean that the
debate should precede the program. This
would be a more democratic approach, which
seems to be what they favour. The phrase
'political community', however, raises problems:
isn't that too restrictive a term and in
contradiction to the authors' belief that parliamentary
staff should be involved? The challenge
will be to elicit an involvement which
does not simply reflect existing power structures
and entrenched interests. Parliamentary
officers do not spend their lives working with
politicians without learning a trick or two.
Conclusion
The Foley-Russell Report deserves wide
notice and it would be a surprising lapse if
Legislative Studies did not seek a number of
responses to it. It requires a variety of viewpoints
to bring out its rich content. The
present review, focusing on the internal
administrative apparatus of the Victorian
Legislature, may be seen as a rather sceptical
one based on many years of parliamentary
service elsewhere. But it is not unsympathetic
since I share the authors' concern that 'Causa
tua agitur'. I agree with their general diagnosis
of the performance of the parliamentary
bureaucracy, of the deficient staff management
policies, and of the needs for better staff
training and education procedures.
One major and surprising omission from
the Report is any consideration of
cost-benefit. The recommendations will lead
to heavier costs for parliamentary government
in Victoria: will those costs really be justified?
Bearing in mind N. Wran's homely
wisdom quoted earlier, one would need to
find someone uninvolved to give an answer.
As far as I can ascertain, no-one has done any
detailed analysis of the real costs of parliamentary
government in Australia, surely one
of the major growth areas in the public sector,
if Canberra is any indication. The true picture
in Canberra is extremely complex and should
prove a rewarding, if thorny, subject for
study. Victoria is likely to be simpler, but one
would welcome some sound data on the
question, especially the benefits!
It is, to my mind, very doubtful if political
parties will ever want to have specific
policies for parliament. They don't really
need them and they would, in any case not be
bound by them. Why should they? Parliament
is an instrument to be used, and political
considerations of the day decide the
manner of use. It is, of course, in the interest
of those involved to have a fully efficient
instrument, but in some ways one can defend
the thesis that we should look to the parliamentary
bureaucracy, that is, career officers
expecting, to spend their working life in parliament,
to protect the interests of the organisation
(if that is the right term) from the
excesses of the temporary kings, the elected
members. Political concerns are often' for
short-term advantage, whereas institutions
such as parliaments which one expects will
exist for many decades need to give thought
to longer-term concerns.
One may strongly agree with the FoleyRussell
Report on its views respecting the
need to improve staff status and career
prospects. Is it unrealistic to suggest that all
the parliaments co-operate to establish specially
designed joint training courses for
career officers in the techniques of their
calling and in Australian and comparative
parliamentary history, traditions, etc.? Such
training courses might well use the experience
and knowledge of retired senior officers
and provide some kind of certification or
evaluation which could assist in the performance
appraisal system proposed by the
authors. Parliaments have ample funds for far
less worthy causes and in view of the small
numbers likely to be involved and the
unavailability of suitable courses elsewhere, a
strong case could be made for courses of a
modest duration. Such courses could even
interest outsiders and possibly generate
income.
The changes which the authors propose
are also needed because parliaments are
increasingly less of the mysterious closed
shops they used to be. Their staff turnovers
have risen noticeably and some departing
staff have been vocal about the deficiencies
they have experienced. Recruitment seems to
be less nepotistic than earlier. Parliamentary
administrations have already improved this
level of skill when one considers the relaxed
style of years ago. At that time incursions by
curious or critical outsiders were easily
repelled: nowadays that is less possible or
prudent. The question remains, however,
whether the changes made are enough:
clearly Messrs Foley and Russell don't think
so, nor do many members.
The advent of electronic technology,
especially computers, has had a strong and, at
times, unsettling effect on parliamentary
organisations. In general the parliamentary
libraries have been far ahead of most parliamentary
departments in establishing automation,
while other departments have shown a
lack of readiness to move. All parliamentary
departments are nowadays reliant on technical
expertise, often from unawed outsiders,
to cope with automation: this has introduced
a quite novel factor into the complexities of
parliamentary administration. The FoleyRussell
Report does not go into any depth on
this question which would benefit from
analysis of its implications. In the growing
complexity of running a parliament traditional
power bases are not quite as solid as
they were. Staff are more apt to question
authority, bent are also more qualified and
anxious to have an input to policy formulation
at some levels. For these reasons it seems
sensible to explore the possibility of creating a
range of formal co-operative administrative
techniques involving various levels of staff on
an inter departmental basis. It is for the staff's
benefit as well as for the needs of the institution.
The establishment of a more clearly 'collegiate'
style of administration, at appropriate
levels and for specific purposes, would help
achieve some of the goals the Foley-Russell
Report recommends. A certain amount of
experimentation and improvisation is necessary
to accommodate the variety and changes
of personalities and the various historical
factors present. What suits one parliament
will not always suit others. One cannot be too
prescriptive until all the factors are known
which only the insider can really be aware of.
Administrative restructuring at senior level
may be far too pat a solution, Le. no real solution
at all. The restructuring may need to be
far more radical and more inclusive, but it
will need to be flexible and realistic. Neatness
may be the least useful solution in the long
run.
The idea of a career parliamentary
service needs to be more strongly underlined,
especially in smaller parliaments. Where the
staff establishment is likely to be small, the
career opportunities are necessarily limited. It
may be impossible to expect even moderately
rapid promotion, but it is feasible to create
better job satisfaction by means of rewards
and incentives. The parliaments should not, I
believe, be unduly swayed by what is done in
government departments. Possibly staff
exchange between similar parliaments could
be explored. The parliamentary libraries have
been interested in this idea and several have
taken tentative steps. No doubt a range of
options could be explored. but the chief objective
remains to create a career parliamentary
service with high standards, with performance
appraisal, and capable of providing a
continuity and stability of management in an
intrinsically volatile, unpredictable milieu.
These career officers have to guard the long-
tenn interests of the parliament, especially if
the political heads may be too concerned with
quite other priorities and personal factors,
such as keeping a party in power.9
The Foley-Russell Report opens up many
perspectives. Its value lies as much in its stimulating
effect as in its specific analysis which
is inad~quate because of the authors' attachment
to some well-entrenched myths. Their
understanding of the way parliamentary
culture really works seems incomplete in
some regards. They also fail to mention the
problem of political heads having interests
and behavioural traits inimical to the ultimate
welfare of the institution they control.
Perhaps they chose to exclude this difficult
topic from their purview. One can, however,
readily agree with the authors that parliaments
can scarcely survive as they are
presently run in a world becoming increasingly
questioning of their relevance. The institution
is too intrinsically valuable to be
allowed to drift haphazardly. There are many
fine people staffing them and members of
parliament are also anxious for the institutions
to be more effective. The effort to find
the creative ideas to bring all the relevant
factors into harmony and create an organisation
able to sustain the needs of a fast
approaching new century is surely well worth
making by all who value parliamentary government.
This spirit underlies the Report of
Messrs Foley and Russell, and they merit our
regard for their contribution to this goal.10
References
Some small stylistic improvements would
enhance the Report if it is re-printed. Plural
subjects are followed in several cases by singular
verbs. The adverb 'however' is used
occasionally as a conjunction. More serious is
the appalling bibliography which is a silly
piece of work, inaccurate in some details and
generally of little use. The authors should seek
the help of the Victorian Parliamentary
Library if there is any chance of a re-issue.
2. The Paper by Dr Philomena Murray entitled
Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Administration
0989, 121p.) represents almost the only
recent attempt to survey this question in Australia.
Dr Murray was commissioned in July
1989 by the Victorian Parliament to study 'the
administrative arrangements which exist in
Parliaments of other states in Australia and in
other relevant countries so that the Parliamentary
administration in Victoria might usefully
be examined in the light of the arrangements
in comparable situations, (p .4). Much data
were secured by means of questionnaires.
The Paper contains a great deal of information,
but it is not assembled in an easy fashion for
the reader. The Paper obviously entailed a
large amount of work and seems to have been
compiled against tight deadlines. This has not
assisted the result. It would be greatly wel·
corned if a revised, better worked-over and
better organised version of this useful compilation
could be made. The copy I have seen
has no date of publication (presumably 1989),
or imprint on it. Its bibliogr~phy is also open
to improvement.
3. A detailed review of the nature of changes to
public management in Britain, and also applicable
to Australia, is found in The New Public
Management' in Public Administration Vol. 69,
No. 1 (Spring 1991).
4. Issued in December 1987. Produced by desktop
publishing and available from the office of the
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly.
5. It is curious that one of the criticisms made by
members of the Upper House in their debate
on the Foley-Russell Report was that, contrary
to what the authors stated, there was no consultation
by them with members. (See Parliamentary
Debates (Legislative Council of
Victoria), 10 April 1991 p.582 ft.)
6. In December 1991 two Queensland Ministers
and the Leader of the Opposition resigned
their positions because of malpractices in the
use of Members' entitlements. Apparently a
large number of Members from all parties of
the Queensland Parliament were also impli~
cated in these malpractices which had
occurred at an earlier period.
7. 'A Seat Apart: Proposal: An Independent Continu~
ing Speakership for New South Wales', by K.
Rozzoli, M.P., pp. 182-185 in The Parliamen~
tarian (July 1991). This Paper advocates some
novel notions which would greatly benefit the
parliamentary institution in terms of stability
and continuity of administration and political
impartiality. The Paper does not directly
address the need for a Speaker's accountability
for his administration. If Speakers are
elected 'for a period not exceeding 10 years',
there is clearly need. for provision of checks and
balances and monitoring of performance. A
counterbalance needs to be found for cases
where presiding officers (and sometimes Clerks)
prove themselves capricious, unduly interventionist,
or Simply silly. Presiding officers have
little need to be accountable for much of their
administration. Perhaps such qualities are part
of the 'human condition' and do no great harm
if restricted to interior decoration and personal
comfort, but unfortunately unchecked power
tends to seek ever new worlds to conquer.
8. Political factors must always predominate in
the affairs of parliaments. Elections may bring
new Presiding Officers with little prior
training and even with some axes to grind
against staff who did not please them when
they were backbenchers. There is little can be
done under present arrangements to guard
against eccentric or wilful Presiding Officers.
Even Clerks have a wide scope for arbitrariw
ness. The instructive and extraordinary case of
Speaker Willis in NSW (1911) is something of
an extreme example. Openness in decisionmaking
and a greater degree of accountability
at all levels seem about the most one can
expect. These are not likely to come without
minor earthquakes and only under particularly
favourable political constellations.
Perhaps this might be seen in years to come as
something to be said for parliaments where
Independents hold the balance of power.
9. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence about the
personality factor in the parliamentary sphere.
It would be a challenging task to research the
subject more deeply in its relationship to how
parliaments are administered. Such a task
would require a range of skills going beyond
political science and could not be carried out
without a great deal of inside help. Probably
it cannot be done adequately.
(The author acknowledges the valuable suggestions
he has received from Or D. H Clune of the New
South Wales Parliamentary Library.)



“The People Who Helped Me the Most Were the Librarians” – Rep. Elijah Cummings


Via SJL – “Congressman Elijah Cummings, in this brief clip, recalls the time he spent as a child at the Enoch Pratt Free Library in Baltimore. “The people who helped me the most were the librarians,” Cummings told Steve Kroft in a 60 Minutes interview broadcast in January of this year, adding that the public library was the only integrated institution in his neighborhood. Speaking about the librarians, whom he credited with staying past their regular working hours to help him with his schoolwork, enabling him to get out of special ed, the longtime Baltimore congressman and chair of the House Oversight Committee got emotional.  “There are a lot of good people who really care,” he said. The complete interview with Cummings, who died October 24, 2019, is available from CBS News…”


Grappling With The Purpose Of The Public Library

If public libraries are not for the rich, they probably are not otherwise for the poor. To understand the public library as a benevolent form of welfare would be to entirely miss the radical potential of the institution as a political project. It isn’t utopian, nor is about culturing the masses, nor offering the marginalized a space where they mustn’t “pay for coffee.” – The Baffler